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ABSTRACT 
An investigation was undertaken to discover the causes 
for the failure of NASA Aerobee 150 flights 4.81 GG and 
4.86 NA. After analyzing the flight performance data and 
comparing them with the data for two similar successful 
flights, NASA flights 4.15 GG and 4.88 GT, it was concluded 
that the most probable cause for rocket malfunction in each 
case was  a bimodal instability arising from the coupling of 
an abnormally low body bending mode with the vehicle 
aerodynamic pitching mode which, in turn, caused yaw 
(pitch)-roll coupling and lock-in. Corrective measures 
proposed as a result of this investigation have been insti- 
tuted, and no similar Aerobee rocket failures have been 
experienced since. 
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AEROBEE 150 
STRUCTURAL AND AERODYNAMIC PITCH COUPLING 
by 
J. R. Busse and G. E. Kraft 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
INTRODUCTION 
An investigation was  undertaken to determine the causes of failure on NASA Aerobee 150 
flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA so that corrective action could be taken to avoid similar failure in the 
future. These two flights were analyzed and the analyses compared with those of the flight re- 
sults of two similar but successful flights, NASA 4.15 GG and 4.88 GT. The most probable cause 
of failure of flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA appears to have been the result of the dynamic coupling 
between structural and aerodynamic yaw (pitch) modes which subsequently caused yaw (pitch)- 
roll coupling and lock-in. 
Detailed data plots are provided in Appendix A to support the conclusions arising from this 
report. This appendix contains many charts which were produced during the reduction of data for 
successful flights 4.15 GG and 4.86 NA as well as those for flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. Their 
arrangement provides a rapid means of comparison in each category of data discussed. 
Calculations are included in Appendix B to substantiate failure theories arising from the fail- 
u re  investigations. 
It is important to note that Appendix C contains definitions for the terminology used in this 
analysis, since these t e rms  have not been rigorously defined in words by the technical commu- 
nity. Their definition is essential to this analysis and discussion of results. 
More information on these rockets and related subjects is given in References 1 through 5. 
FLIGHT HISTORY 
The evaluations here represent an analysis of the successive malfunctions of two NASA 
Aerobee 150 Sounding Rockets at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The two failed 
vehicles were NASA 4.81 GG, launched on 9 April 1964, and NASA 4.86 NA, launched on 14 April 
1964. These vehicles were unprecedented because each used a 20" cone/cylinder nose cone 
rather than the more common 31-caliber ogive nose and because the payload extension length and 
the resultant number of payload joints used exceeded those on other cone/cylinder configurations 
previously launched. 
"roll lock-in" problems, two similarly configured vehicles, NASA 4.15 GG and NASA 4.88 GT, had 
previously been launched successfully. A joint effort  was undertaken by the Space General Corp. 
(SGC) and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to investigate the abnormal performance of NASA 
Although NASA flights 4.81 GG and NASA 4.86 NA exhibited what initially appeared to be solely 
Table 1 
Flight Statistics. 
Flight Statistic 
Sustainer serial  no. 
Booster ser ia l  no. 
Sustainer thrust chamber 
misalignment (in.)* 
Total dry weight (lb) 
Net payload (lb) 
Overall length (in.) 
Equivalent extension length (in.) 
Average fin cant (min)** 
Expected burnout roll  ra te  for  fin 
Actual max. roll  rate (rps) 
Burnout time (sec) 
Burnout altitude (ft) 
Burnout velocity (fps) 
Max. velocity (fps) 
Time of max. velocity (sec) 
Max. acceleration boost (g) 
Max. acceleration (sustainer 
setting and net payload ( rps) 
thrusting) (g) 
celeration (sec) 
Peak altitude (ft) 
Peak time (sec) 
Number of joints in payload 
Nose cone type 
Time of max. sustainer ac- 
~ 
4.15 GG 
NASA 109-3 
858186 
0.035 at  237" 
529.9 
258.4 
321.8 
43.2 
17.5 
1.78 
1.65 
53.2 
130,675 
5900 
5900 
53.2 
9.9 
6.7 
51.0 
62 6,3 59 
231.3 
11 
Cone/cylinder 
*SGC reading at assembly of sustainer, looking forward with fin I at Oo. 
**Fins were set at the maximum cant obtainable on al l  vehicles. 
2 
4.81 GG 
NASA 102-3 
858197 
0.117 at  250" 
540.9 
271.5 
335.0 
56.2 
17.5 
1.76 
1.1 
52.6 
110,246 
3490 
3490 
52.0 
12.2 
6.1 
52.0 
243,084 
141.8 
11 
Cone/cylinder 
4.86 NA 
NASA 103-3 
A-117 
0.105 at  165" 
548.7 
277.2 
332.0 
53.4 
17.5 
1.75 
1.0 
52.6 
91,247 
1080 
3450 
41 
9.4 
7.3 
52.0 
102,188 
77.4 
11 
Cone/cylinder 
4.88 GT 
NASA 101-3 
858180 
0.093 at  255" 
562.4 
290.9 
330.0 
51.5 
17.5 
1.7 
1.5 
52.3 
120,162 
5310 
5459 
53.5 
10.0 
6.7 
52.3 
652,963 
252.6 
9 
Ogive 
flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. The performance data from the two similar flights were used as a 
basis for comparison. 
General observations on the data for each flight are made; obvious similarities and dissim- 
ilarities a r e  discussed later in detail with explanatory comments to support the derived theories. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the statistics for each flight. 
Flight Failures of NASA 4.81 66 and NASA 4.86 NA Rockets 
NASA flight 4.81 GG took place on 9 April 1964. The early motion of the Aerobee rocket 
remained steady arid appeared normal; no abnormal transient responses were observed to result 
from the tower exit, booster burnout, booster separation, o r  wind effects. At approximately 
T + 29 seconds, the rocket began to display an abnormal divergent coning motion. The amplitudes 
observed were small initially, and the frequency w a s  essentially equal to the roll rate. The ab- 
normal rocket coning motion continued and increased in magnitude until approximately T + 39 
seconds. The coning half angle had grown to approximately 8" by T + 39 seconds and the basic 
frequency had dropped to approximately one- half of the theoretical pitch frequency. This indicated 
that the classical yaw (pitch)-roll lock-in did not occur up to this time, although the yaw (pitch)- 
roll coupling had been initiated. 
Pitch and yaw plots for this flight are shown in Figures 1 and 2 compared with plots for 
flights 4.15 GG and 4.88 GT. The abnormal pitch and yaw motions a r e  clearly evident after T + 29 
seconds; prior to this time 4.81 GG appears better behaved than either 4.15 GG or  4.88 GT, since 
it exhibits less pitch and yaw motion. 
A t  an altitude of approximately 66,550 feet (T + 39.5 seconds), a premature ejection of the 
nose tip occurred while the vehicle w a s  still burning. This occurrence was preceded by a sec- 
ondary oscillation (read on gyro outputs) of approximately 3.5 cps. Following the nose tip ejec- 
tion, yaw (pitch)-roll coupling began, accompanied by excessive aerodynamic drag. The roll rate 
began to decrease rapidly from 1 rps  to the pitch frequency and by T + 42 seconds the rocket w a s  
fully "locked-in." During the time from T + 40 to T + 42 seconds, the observed pitch-yaw fre- 
quency rose slightly and equaled the roll rate, which was  diminishing. At  T + 40 seconds the 
coning half angle was greater than 15", and at T + 42 seconds it had reached a stable value of 35". 
Figure 3a shows the center of motion shifts observed on flight 4.81 GG. The vehicle achieved 
an apogee of only 42.5 statute miles (at T + 141.8 seconds), and since the altitude control system 
(ACS) had no opportunity to start pointing at programmed targets (because of the low altitude at- 
tained), no experimental data were obtained. Two cameras and two spectrographs contained in 
the payload sections were to have obtained spectral data of certain stellar and nebular sources. 
The parachute deployed successfully, and the payload w a s  recovered in excellent condition. 
Flight 4.86 NA took place on 14 April 1964. The rocket performance during the initial sec- 
onds of flight appeared to be normal, just  as for flight 4.81 GG. At approximately T + 30 seconds 
3 
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Figure 1-Yaw vs. time; comparison of flights 4.15 GG, 4.81 GG, and 4.88 GT. 
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Figure 2-Pitch vs. time; comparison of flights 4.15 GG, 4.81 GG, and 4.88 GT. 
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CW PITCH 
Figure 3a - ACS yaw position vs. ACS pitch position, fl ight 4.81 GG. 
(Coordinates are in degrees; points are in seconds from l i f t  off.) 
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the vehicle started coning similarly to the 4.81 GG, and at T + 38 seconds it reached the yaw 
(pitch)-roll resonance point. Gyro data received indicated a pitch rate of 60" per second at 
this time. 
The angle of attack continued to open up as a result of yaw (pitch)-roll coupling. Figure 4 
shows roll rate plotted against time for this flight. At T + 42 seconds the vehicle was locked-in 
and extremely large and erratic coning angles resulted after this point. The stable coning motion 
that had been observed on 4.81 GG after lock-in w a s  not in evidence on 4.86 NA: the acceler- 
ometer continued to register errat ic  accelerations until T + 49 seconds and dropped to 0 at T + 50 
seconds (Figure 5). It is assumed that the ejection of the nose tip on 4.81 GG probably contributed 
more regular post lock-in motion than 4.86 NA. Note in Figure 6 that the vertical velocity of 
4.86 NA began a sharp decline at approximately 41 seconds and continued to drop steadily. 
Although the tip ejected at 61.5 seconds, no experimental objectives could be realized since 
the ACS failed to function with such erratic vehicle performance. The vehicle attained a peak 
altitude of only 18.2 statute miles. The parachuted payload w a s  successfully recovered. 
\ VEHICLE YAW (PITCH)-ROLL LOCKED IN +/ 
(ACS ROLL POSITION GYRO DATA) 
I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 40 52 
TIME (seconds) 
0 
Figure  4-Roll ra te vs. time, f l i g h t  4.86 NA. 
Comparison of NASA Flights 4.15 GG and 4.88 GT 
Flight 4.15 GG occurred on 2 April 1964. In t e rms  of rocket performance the vehicle was 
considered successful, but the experimental objectives were not attained because the ACS failed 
to align with the gyrbs to point the rocket at inertially programmed targets. 
The launch and flight of 4.15 GG was normal. Some transient responses due to tower exit 
disturbances, booster burnout, booster separation, and wind were indicated in the first seconds 
of night; however, these responses were not considered abnormal. 
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Figure 6-Actual vertical velocity compared with theoretical total velocity i n  flight 4.86 NA. 
9 
Figure 7 is a comparison plot of roll rate and theoretical pitch frequency for the two failed . 
flights and the two successful flights, 4.15 GG and 4.88 GT.* Figure 3b shows the sizeable shifts 
in the center of motion of rocket 4.15 GG which occurred between T + 8.5 and T + 34 seconds. 
These shifts make it difficult to determine the exact nature of the rocket's motion; however, the 
motion w a s  determined to be a mixture of transient oscillations at the pitch frequency and fairly 
steady oscillations at the roll rate. The oscillations at the roll rate were attributed primarily to 
thrust chamber and other structural misalignment. 
After about T + 34 seconds, the motion of the rocket on the position gyro pitch and yaw traces  
became more easily discernible. Two distinct frequency components were evident-one slightly 
below the natural pitch frequency and one equal to the roll rate. Although the oscillation at the 
pitch frequency closely approximated the theoretical pitch frequency calculated for the flight, 
some coning-type motion was  present. There was no evidence of coupling during yaw (pitch)-roll 
resonance which occurred between T + 39 and T + 40 seconds. 
The rocket attained a peak altitude of 118 statute miles in 235 seconds as predicted, with tip 
ejection occurring at T + 85 seconds. The parachute package deployed successfully and a re- 
covery was accomplished as planned. 
Flight 4.88 GT w a s  successfully carried out on 28 January 1964 at White Sands; the rocket 
reached a peak altitude of 114 statute miles. The rocket and all instrumentation performed as 
expected; this indicated good rocket control and stabilization. 
Large and frequent pitch and yaw motions by the rocket and sizeable transient frequency responses 
were indicated prior to T + 31 seconds (Figure 3c). As in flight 4.15 GG, the motion became more 
regular near yaw (pitch)-roll resonance (Figure 7). The position gyro outputs had indicated prior 
to this time that the frequencies were composed of a mixture of transient pitch responses (the 
result of tower exit, booster separation, and wind shears) and roll rate frequencies. At yaw 
(pitch)-roll resonance, large transient disturbances of short  duration were observed. These were 
followed by motions which were primarily at the natural pitch frequency, rather than at the roll 
rate as observed on flight 4.15 GG. Thrust chamber misalignments not measured during rocket 
build-up were a possible contributing cause of the rapid t r im  changes near resonance. No signs 
of yaw (pitch)-roll coupling o r  yaw (pitch)-roll lock-in were evident. 
The recovery system functioned as planned and the payload was in excellent condition. 
The principal points of physical comparison for each flight vehicle are: 
1. All vehicles contained long payloads, although the payloads on successful flights 4.15 GG 
and 4.88 GT were not as long as those on failed flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. 
2. Vehicle 4.15 GG had a cone/cylinder nose, a 43.2-inch extension length, a 258.4-pound net 
payload, and 11 joints. 
*The theoretical pitch frequency curves are presented since actual frequencies cannot be determined from available flight 
data. 
be very small. 
However, the differences between the 300-lb pitch frequency curve and the actual expected pitch frequency curve would 
10 
11 
3. Vehicle 4.81 GG (failed flight) had a cone/cylinder nose, a 56.2-inch extension length, a 
271.5-pound net payload, and 11 joints; its nose was  ejected at 39 seconds. 
4. Vehicle 4.86 NA (failed flight) had a cone/cylinder nose, a 53.4-inch extension length, a 
277.2-pound net payload, and 11 joints. 
5. Vehicle 4.88 GT had an ogive nose, a 51.5-inch extension length, and a 290.9-pound net 
payload, but only 8 joints. 
DATA REDUCTION 
All available performance and telemetered data for each flight were compiled, reduced, and 
examined. Wherever possible, these data were combined to facilitate comparative analyses of 
performance characteristics for each of the flights. The complete data are contained in Appendix A. I 
Chamber Pressure 
The chamber pressure plots of all four vehicles were examined (Figure Al) .  No patent evi- 
dence of thrust chamber contribution to the malfunction of flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA was indi- 
cated. The plots for  each vehicle indicate a steady chamber pressure with no extreme o r  unusual 
fluctuations. An initial surge of pressure was noted for each; however, this is a normal s ta r t  
occurrence. 
Fuel Pressure 
Fuel pressure was  not monitored on 4.15 GG. The plot which includes fuel pressure for  4.81 
GG (Figure A2) indicates normal pressure levels during the burning phase. The plot for  4.86 NA 
the vehicle. The 4.88 GT plot also indicates normal burning pressure levels and pressure reduc- 
tion after burnout for despinning. 
, 
I indicates normal pressure levels during burning, with the expected reduction as the ACS despins 
Oxidizer Pressure 
I 
Oxidizer pressure was not monitored on 4.15 GG o r  4.81 GG. Figure A3 shows oxidizer pres-  
sure  for flights 4.86 NA and 4.88 GT. No reduction in pressure is observed in the plot for 4.86 NA, 
which indicates that yaw maneuvers, to be activated by the ACS, did not take place as planned. 
(This could be expected because of errat ic  rocket performance.) The reduction in pressure,  
starting at T + 89 seconds on the plot for 4.88 GT, indicates the beginning of the sequence of yaw 
maneuvers for this vehicle; the continuing decrease is representative of ACS gas usage. 
I Acceleration 
I The acceleration plots for each rocket, Figure A4, indicate that all the rockets exhibited nor- 
mal booster acceleration levels, as well as the normal acceleration dip occurring when each vehicle 
12 
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.passed through the period of maximum load (T + 12 to T + 16 seconds). Although the plots for 
4.15 GG and 4.88 GT indicate some fluctuations in acceleration, they a r e  consistent with normal 
flight trajectories during the remainder of the flight path. 
Vehicle 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA, however, exhibited normal acceleration .fluctuations up to, and 
after, the T + 40 to T + 46 second period. During the period between T + 40 and T + 46 seconds, 
these rockets exhibited some abnormal changes in acceleration and they were especially drastic 
for Flight 4.86 NA. Since chamber pressure was normal for these flights during the same period, 
and there were no other obvious anomalies that could have caused such a reaction, it is apparent 
that erratic vehicle maneuvers are responsible for the fluctuations measured by the accelerometers. 
Velocity 
Vertical velocity was plotted for each flight and compared with theoretical velocities (Figure 
A5). The comparison indicates that actual vehicle performance compared favorably with the 
theoretical velocity in each case for time up to T + 40 seconds (Llie average yaw (pitch)-roll 
resonance time). There was not an unusual amount of rocket motion in flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 
NA to cause a performance loss  for the vehicle until that time. After T + 40 seconds, however, 
the effect of the aerodynamic drag and coning that occurred with yaw (pitch)-roll coupling and 
subsequently with yaw (pitch)-roll lock-in is evident. 
The altitude plots (Figure A6) reflect the time-velocity relationships for each flight. Curves 
indicating a theoretical trajectory are also included for flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. 
Velocity Vectors 
The velocity vector plots shown in Figure A7 for 4.86 NA and 4.88 GT indicate the actual 
orientation of the vehicle velocity vector in space. The nominal change in orientation is indicative 
of the response of the vehicle to winds and other transient effects and to the gravity turn. In the 
case of 4.88 GT, this variation reflects a normal change throughout the burning phase. The mag- 
nitude of change in the azimuth of 4.86 NA, which became significant at 34 seconds, is indicative 
of abnormal vehicle motion. It is noted that the azimuth change became magnified at 40 seconds, 
which is coincident with the period of abnormal acceleration noted earlier. 
It was also observed that the azimuth varied in approximately an east-west direction, starting 
with approximately a 1 cycle/second frequency and deteriorating to 1/2 cycle/second. When this 
'was  compared with the roll  history of 4.86 NA, it was noted that this frequency tends to fol- 
low the roll  frequency. This correlation suggests that during the period discussed the forward 
end of the vehicle was shifting back and forth in approximately a single plane, following the roll 
frequency. An imbalance of payload mass could cause this behavior. Such imbalance would be a 
major contributor to end joint play and resonance coupling. 
13 
Y a w  Frequency I 
Comparison of the yaw frequency of NASA vehicles 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA with that of vehicles 
4.15 GG and 4.88 GT (Figure A8) shows no apparent relationship of yaw frequency to the problem. 
Both the magnitude and rate of change in frequency are of a lower order for vehicles 4.81 GG and 
4.86 NA. If this criterion were a predictable measure for failure, the reversed relationship might 
be expected. The observed differences by themselves are therefore insignificant to failure. 
I 
Pitch Frequency 
Although pitch frequency w a s  not monitored on 4.86 NA, it w a s  obtained for flight 4.81 GG. 
From a comparison of the pitch frequency plot of flight 4.81 GG with pitch data for flights 4.15 GG 
and 4.88 GT (Figure A9) it is evident that the successful flights showed higher pitch levels. The 
rate of change of flight 4.88 GT was also of a higher magnitude than that of the other two flights. 
A s  is the case with yaw frequency, however, pitch frequency alone does not necessarily affect the 
success o r  failure of the rocket. 
I 
Roll Rate  
The roll data for all four vehicles (Figure A10) indicated normal levels during the booster 
phase and normal fluctuation at the time of maximum load (at approximately T + 12 seconds). For 
flights 4.15 GG and 4.88 GT, the roll rate continued to rise through burnout. 
The roll rates of 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA are observed to increase in a normal manner, after 
passing through the period of maximum load until T + 30 seconds. At this time, approaching the 
pitch (yaw)-roll resonance frequency, they both show erratic changes in rate, with a la ter  decrease 
indicative of pitch (yaw)- roll lock-in. 
Wind Data 
The atmospheric winds at launch were compared (Figure A l l )  to deduce if any shears  could 
affect the vehicles structurally. An evaluation of wind velocity and azimuthal shifts obviates the 
possibility that the vehicles could be so affected. Any such degradation would normally be ex- 
pected of flight 4.15 GG, and that flight was  successful in t e rms  of rocket performance. 
Stabil i ty Data  
Center of Gravity (CG) 
The curves of CG against time (Figure A12) are presented only as a comparison between ve- 
hicles. These curves do not reflect the actual variation (which is not practically measurable) but 
they are based on weigh-in values and theoretical propellant usage. 
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. 
at booster burnout. Thereafter, they reflect propellant usage. No anomalies, such as an improper 
propellant mixture ratio, are indicated which would have changed the curve. 
The curves from 0 to 2.5 seconds reflect the presence of the booster, which drag-separates 
Center of Pressure (CP) 
The C P  data (Figure A12) compare the C P  location, in calibers from the nose tip, and the 
time. These data reflect actual flight performance (altitude and velocity vs. time), but the Mach 
number on which C P  is based was derived by using a standard atmosphere. At the t ime these 
data were reduced, the actual flight environment w a s  not available. A review of the speed-of- 
sound data indicates that the Mach number would change by only about 0.06 if  the actual atmos- 
phere had been used. This difference would produce a negligible change in the C P  location. The 
C P  location is quite consistent up to T + 40 seconds in the vehicles under study. They would not 
be expected to be exactly the same, because the location reflects both vehicle length/diameter 
(fineness) ratio and Mach number. The variation after T + 40 seconds for 4.86 NA and 4.81 GG 
reflects the decrease in velocity. 
Static Margin 
The static margin is the difference in calibers between the locations of the CG and the C P  of 
the vehicle, with the C P  always being aft of the CG for a stable vehicle. Criteria existing prior 
to these flights required that the minimum margin be greater than 1.5 calibers. Since none of the 
vehicles had margins that small  (Figure A12) we may conclude that this margin was not a cause 
of failure. As an additional safety factor, the minimum static margin must now be greater than 
2.0 calibers. 
Restoring Moment Coefficient C ,  
The moment coefficient C, is the product of the static margin SM and the normal force coef- 
a 
ficient C ,  which increases as the Mach number M decreases. Thus we see  that, conversely, as 
Mach number decreases (for values of M > 1) C ,  increases, and the C P  moves aft, causing the 
margin to increase also. The combination of these forces produced a r i s e  in c, in 4.81 GG 
after T + 40 seconds and an increase of the static margin in 4.86 N A  (Figure A12). Thus, if the 
coefficient increases and the velocity remains constant, the restoring force also increases.  
a 
a 
a 
Restoring Moment (Ma) 
The curves of Ma in Figure A13 indicate that the restoring force of all vehicles was quite 
s imilar  throughout powered flight. The decreased velocity of the malfunctioning vehicles counter- 
acted the increase in c, . 
a 
Moment M a  would also be expected to  increase with angle of attack if  all other parameters 
remain constant. It can be concluded that the velocity was reduced to such a low magnitude that 
M a  continued to decrease regardless of the angle of attack o r  the increase in C M a  .
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Speed of Sound 
Because performance predictions have been based on the data in Reference 6, the speeds of 
sound for  actual flight atmospheric conditions was compared with those given in that standard in 
Figure A14. The speed of sound in the atmosphere seen by 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA was lower during 
their trouble period than that in the standard atmosphere. An evaluation of the slight increase in 
Mach number seen by the vehicles, and the consequent shift forward of the CP, produced a reduc- 
tion in margin of the order of 0.05 caliber. Since the margin deduced by using the standard at- 
mosphere never was less than 2.0 calibers, a change of this small  magnitude was not enough to 
cause aerodynamic instability. Thus, this was not significant to the failure. 
Atmospheric Density 
A number of the calculations of forces acting on the vehicle a r e  based on the atmospheric 
density, including the restoring force (M,). The actual flight atmospheres for each of the failed 
and successful flights were compared with the standard (Figure A15). Since all flight atmospheres 
observed were equal to, o r  more dense than, the standard atmosphere up through 100,000 feet, 
where the vehicles would be most responsive to any variation, the conclusion was reached that, in 
all cases, the forces acting to  restore the vehicles to their normal attitudes were actually some- 
what greater than those plotted in the restoring moment curves. 
Number of Joints in Payload 
The comparison of the number of joints in the payload sections in Figure A16 suggests the 
first solid clue to the cause of failures. The two failed vehicles are among the longest flown and 
each contained eleven joints. It is thus suspected that the effect of joints on the structural rigidity 
leads to failure. 
Although flight 4.15 GG also contained eleven joints, its payload section was more than 10 
inches shorter than that of either of the failed vehicles. Presumably the structural integrity and 
dynamic stability were improved by this length decrease and no yaw (pitch)-roll coupling occurred 
during the period of resonance. 
Payload Length and Static Margin 
The location of static margin on the failed vehicles of sizeable payload length was also signi- 
ficant in the investigation (Figure A17). It is possible that the static margin should not be a con- 
stant value to be established for all Aerobee vehicles, but that the minimum margin between CG 
and C P  should increase as the vehicle length increases. Until more analytic data become avail- 
able in this area,  the minimum accepted static margin at burnout for typical Aerobee rocket con- 
figuration has been increased. Thus, the margin of stability (in calibers) has been improved to 
reduce apprehension that subsequent failure might result due to low static stability. 
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Analysis o f  Signif icant Data 
Aerobee 150 vehicles employing long extensions and heavy payloads with many joints and 
cone/cylinder nose cones have exhibited a propensity toward roll lock-in with accompanying 
catastrophic yaw (pitch) effects. After comparing flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA with two similar 
successful flights, these failures seem basically due to a bimodal instability arising from the 
coupling of an abnormally low body bending mode with the vehicle aerodynamic pitch mode. This 
coupling, further, seems to be caused by excessive end play in the joints of the payload section. 
Yaw (pitch)-roll lock-in was a logical result of the structural-aerodynamic coupling which pre- 
ceded it. The static margins, although slightly lower than those shown in theoretical curves, were 
not considered to be dangerous at the time of flight; however, this experience has led to further 
considerations which indicate that larger margins might be desirable. The received acceleration 
histories, motor performance data, and tracking data all had failed to provide any significant evi- 
dence of a rocket motor malfunction. The effect of wind shears during these flights is not con- 
sidered a contributing cause to the failures. 
Normally, after launch, the rocket's natural pitchingfrequency reaches a maximum at 12 seconds 
and decreases while the roll frequency increases with time. The two frequencies are the same at 
approximately T + 40 seconds of flight time. At this critical time of flight, if some abnormal con- 
dition causes the two frequencies to couple at resonance and later lock-in, effects such as those 
observed on flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA can be expected to result. The rocket's roll  rate, unable 
to increase above the rocket's basic yaw (pitch) frequency, drops off drastically with the yaw 
(pitch) frequency. When this occurs, the angle of attack opens up and very large coning motions 
are observed. Instability continues with the accompanying effects of increased drag and an 
abrupt deterioration of velocity performance. 
compared with two similarly configured successful flights (4.15 GG and 4.88 GT), clearly illustrate 
these phenomena. Figure 7 clearly shows the abnormal roll  behavior of the failed flights compared 
with the roll behavior of successful similar flights. Note the severe drop in the roll rate for  flights 
4.81 GG and 4.86 NA and how they couple and later lock-in with the theoretical pitch frequency 
(300-lb payload curve). 
Both failures (4.81 GG and 4.86 NA), when 
Every attempt was made to compare flight performance data of similar successful and un- 
successful flights to substantiate the validity of the conclusions deducted as a result of this bimodal 
study. Specific calculations arising from this effort were made prior to the launching of the next 
Aerobee rocket, flight 4.67 NP, to verify the assumptions made and, to make changes so that 
another possible failure would be avoided. 
stantiate this theory. The method and results of the analysis are provided in Appendix B. 
Although the analysis is not a rigorous solution to the rocket bimodal instability problem, it does 
provide a nominal quantity of computations which indicate the probable existence of the bimodal 
instability phenomenon. Considerably more complex work would have to be performed to prove 
the form of bimodal instabilities and their amplitudes; however, these computations provide a 
plausible explanation for the two flight failures and an evaluation of the structural properties re- 
quired to produce the interaction of payload joint free play and stiffness. These computations, 
when compared with all analyzed flight data, render a positive deduction that dynamic coupling 
SGC performed aerolastic computations to sub- 
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between structural and pitch modes can indeed produce instabilities and frequencies of the type 
observed for flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. 
, 
CONCLUSIONS 
The primary cause for the malfunctions of the NASA flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA was  struc- 
tural and aerodynamic yaw (pitch) coupling. The coupling frequencies were the result of an ex- 
cessive amount of end play caused by the large number of joints in the longer and heavier payload 
section of the rocket. To avoid similar failures, the following procedures have been initiated: 
1. Sixteen additional screws have been added to increase the rigidity and decrease rotation of 
payload joints when long payloads with more than 40 inches of payload extensions a r e  used o r  when 
two joints a r e  located in close proximity to each other at the aft end of the payload in a rocket con- 
figuration. This is by f a r  the most significant change and should prevent similar failures in the 
future. An improved joint design is being developed by the Sounding Rocket Branch Engineering 
Section and should be ready for flight in 1966. 
2. When possible, the length of the payload is restricted by revised payload design; if long 
payloads a r e  required, ogive nose cones a r e  recommended, in lieu of cone cylinder noses, to ob- 
tain increased stability - a result of the lower nose lift of the ogive which has a fineness ratio of 
5-1. The cone-cylinder has a 3-1  fineness ratio. 
3. The skin thickness of the tail can has been increased in order that the buckling resistance 
of the tail section in cases of high booster acceleration may be increased. This is primarily a 
safety factor, as tail-can loading on the flights in question was not considered great enough to 
cause structural or thrust misalignment problems which could in turn have produced the observed 
phenomena. 
4. More precise fin alignment checks, and thrust chamber alignment checks have been insti- 
tuted. The f ina l  fin and thrust chamber alignment checks a r e  performed after the rocket tail 
cylinder has been installed the final time, making the measurements as representative of flight 
conditions as possible. 
5. The interface of fin and tail can has been modified to permit increased fin cant which can 
produce higher roll rates on rockets with heavy payloads. 
6. Bending test  and sustainer and payload dynamic balancing operations have been instituted 
where applicable on payloads with long or unusual configurations. The bending tests identify struc- 
tural deficiencies in the payload, while dynamic balancing eliminates one destabilizing moment 
which can potentially cause pitch (yaw)-roll coupling. 
7. More thorough instructions for payload assembly, including torquing procedures for rocket 
screw joints and payload alignment procedures, have been provided for the rocket preparation 
personnel. 
* 8. Preflight checks and preparations have been revised and up-dated and are strictly moni- 
tored by the NASA-GSFC vehicle manager responsible for the flight. The material in Reference 
7 is the primary document that was issued to improve the definition of 150 field operations. 
9. Limiting criteria for Aerobee 150 flights have been established as follows: 
(a) Static margin > 2 calibers minimum 
(b) Roll rate at burnout > 2 r p s  < 3 r p s  
(c) Thrust  chamber misalignment < 0.200 in., and 
(d) Maximum payload length, 147.8 in. 
These are general criteria only and, as conditions warrant, the requirements may be raised 
o r  lowered depending on the final payload configuration, e.g., length, weight, number of joints, 
distribution of joints, forebody configuration, and protuberance. No similar NASA Aerobee fa i l -  
u r e s  have occurred since these corrective measures were instituted, This covers flights of which 
many were similar to 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. 
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Appendix A 
Data Plots, Flights 4.15 GG, 4.81 GG, 
4.86 NA, and 4.88 GT 
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Appendix B 
Flight Data Analysis* 
I 
Dynamic Analysis 
This Appendix is included to verify the plausibility of deductions that the failures of Flights 
4.81 GG and 4.86 NA were caused by dynamic coupling and later lock-in between the rocket's 
structural bending mode and the vehicle pitch mode. The analysis is an evaluation of the struc- 
tural  properties (Le., nose joint free play and stiffness) required to produce this interaction. 
To obtain the simplest meaningful physical model which could produce the desired motions, 
the dynamic analysis was restricted to three degrees of freedom. The lateral displacement of a 
I 
I point on the body longitudinal axis is represented as a superposition of rigid body translation, 
rigid body pitch rotation, and deflection of the nose by rotation about a point xo at the base of the I 
nose. The lateral displacement is then written as: 
~ z(x ,  t )  = a o ( t )  + a, ( t > x  + a2  (t) ( x - x o )  & ( x - x o )  ,** (1) 
I 
where 4 (x - xo) is the unit step function at x = x0 . 
Neglecting roll, the kinetic energy is given by 
I 
I 
The Lagrangian equation of motion is then 
d dT dT 
dt ab,  da, - Q n *  for n = 0, 1, 2, 
- - - -  - 
I 
I 
where the generalized forces Q, are given by i 
1 
Qo = L, a, + L,, az - v (La io + M a  i, + B, iz) , 
t 1 
Q, = M, a, t L,, X, az - v (M, io + M~ i l  + B~ i2) , I 
I 
*Based on an analysis performed by A. W. Earnest of the Space General Corporation. i **A list of symbols used in this analysis is provided at the end of this appendix. 
4 1  
and 
1 
Q, = B, a l  + B, a 2  - v (Ba a, +Bq a, + B, a,) - ka,  . 
These are derived by using 
a z ( x ,  t )  1 1 
.(X) ax - V i ( x ,  t )  a l  + a 2 1 ( x - x o )  - v  ( i o + i l x + & ,  (x - x  0) - xo)) ’ (7 ) 
and assuming the lift distribution 4( x )  to be adequately represented by two concentrated loads: 
.e(,) = L n a a ( x n )  S ( X - x n )  + L , , a ( x t )  Z ( x - x , )  1 (8) 
where 6 ( x )  is the Dirac delta function. Inserting Equations 4, 5, and 6 into Equation 3, the equa- 
tions of motion a r e  found, in matrix form, to be 
where w e  have se t  
an = & for n = 0 ,  1, and2,  
with An independent of time, and 
The required input parameters are 
Ba = 22,900 lb-ft, 
Bq = 237,000 lb-ft’, 
B, = 117,400 lb-ft2, 
I = 1021 slug-ft2, 
I, = 139.8 Slug-ft’, 
42 
t 
i 
J = 244.9 slug-ft’, 
La = 15,260 lb, 
L = 44601b, 
“ a  
m = 24.87 slugs, 
Ma = -61,300 lb-ft, 
Mq = 5,851,000 lb-ft’, 
r = 20.15 Slug-ft, 
v = 3220fps, 
and 
x,, = 10.36 f t .  
The spring constant k is left as a f r ee  parameter. The flight conditions considered a r e  those at 
t = 37 seconds (around the normal roll coupling point). Using these inputs, Equation 9 becomes 
0 -19.02 7 . 1 4  [ 15,260 
1820 73.5 R - 0 -61,300 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ]  [AI = 0.
73.5 36.5 22,900 22,900 - k 
(12) 
Setting the determinant of the matrix equal t o  zero and expanding, we obtain 
where 
F(0) = 0.0254R3 + 0.05005R2 + 1.532R , 
and 
G ( Q )  = 1.6450’ + 5.53R4 + 46.5f13 - 841Rz - 41,650R + 25,100 . (15) 
Equation 13 is amenable to root-locus techniques. The zeros, found by setting F(R)  = 0, are 
at 
= 0, -0.985 f 7.47i . 
The poles, found by setting G(R) = 0, are at 
R = 0.596, 11.96, -12.2, -1.853 ? 13.10 i 
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Figure B1 -Pitch-mode root locus plot. 
Figure B1 is a sketch of the resulting root locus 
plot. In this figure k = 0 at the poles and k = 0) 
at the zeroes. 
As  may be seen in Figure B1, the pitch mode 
becomes unstable at k = 42,000 lb-ft/rad. The 
pitch frequency at this point is approximately 
- i R  = 4.2 rad/sec. We wish to find the modal 
coefficient ratios for this condition. Using the 
first two algebraic equations represented by 
Equation 12, we may solve for a o / a l  and a 2 / a 1  
to obtain 
ao/al  = 47.0 /181.072" , 
and 
a2/al = 1.140 /-14.87" . 
Substituting these results into the third equation represented by Equation 12, we may solve for k 
as a check on the solution. This yields 
k = 34,200 b . 8 1 "  . 
It will  be noted that k is not quite.a pure real  quantity and that this magnitude does not agree well  
with the 42,000 figure obtained from Figure B1. This may be attributed to expanding 3 by 3 de- 
terminants and factoring fifth-order polynomials by use of a 10-inch slide rule and to the accuracy 
of the graphical solutions of Figure B1. If I1 is increased to 4.3 i ,  we obtain 
ao /a ,  = 45.0 b78.562" 
a 2 / a l  = 1.162 p 1 5 . 3 '  , 
and 
k = 37,600 /17.1" , 
so  the magnitude of k is brought into somewhat better agreement with Figure B1, but the phase 
angle becomes worse. Extrapolating these two results to zero phase angle for k yields 
ao /a l  = 44.8 /182" , 
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a,/., = 1.132 k 1 4 . 7 "  , 
and 
k = 31,800 . 
We may, with certainty, conclude only that 
45.0 1178.6' a o / a l  5 47.8 /182" , - - 
1.132 5 .,/a, 5 1.162 /-15.3' , - 
and 
31,800 5 - -  k 5 42,000 . 
The variations in ao/al  and a2/a l  are not serious, but the spread in k is rather severe. Note that 
the upper branch of Figure B1 would have i2 % 27 i at  k = 42,000. 
Stat ic  Aeroelastic Analysis* 
In order in obtain the usual static aero- 
elastic solution, we use the equations of motion 
developed for the dynamic analysis, with the 
constraints 
e -  - -  a. - al - i2 = o 
and 
The equations may then be solvedfor a*/., to 
yield 
25,270 
a 2 / a i  - k -8230 
-~ 
for the flight conditions considered. Using this 
result, the variations in static margin may be 
AEROELASTIC EFFECT 
io5  RADIANS PER FOOT- POUND (105/k) 
determined. These are plotted in Figure B2. Figure 82-Static aeroelastic effect on static margin. 
*The input data used for these analyses were data representative of flights 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA. This method of analysis wasused 
to analyze the NASA flight 4.67 N P  configuration(the next rocket to be launched after the failures of 4.81 GG and4.86 NA). NASA 
4.67 N P  was successfully flown in June of 1964 with a configuration similar to 4.81 GG and 4.86 NA, but incorporating the changes 
specified i n  the conclusions of the main report. 
45 
8 
Note that the frequency of oscillation of the pitch branch in the curves of Figure B1 is also a good 
measure of static margin and agrees  fairly well with Figure B2. 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions are drawn from the analyses presented herein: 
1. The basic physical mechanism of dynamic coupling of pitch and structural bending modes 
seems to  be correct and the frequency/stability relationship appears to correspond to flight data 
from 4.81 GG. 
2. The bending/pitch amplitude ratio at the structurally stable point seems unreasonable in 
that free joint play on the order of * 3 O  would be required to explain Flight 4.81 GG. 
3. The most probable cause of disagreement between the analysis and the flight data, with 
respect to amplitude (assuming the amplitude of rt3" is incorrect), is the omission of roll effects 
from these analyses. 
The basic physical mechanism for the dynamic coupling of pitch and structural bending modes 
is correct and does indeed produce such frequency/stability relationships as those observed in 
flight data for the failed flights. 
Symbols I 
Symbol 
A 
a n  
'a 
B, 
Bq 
I O  
I 
J 
k 
La 
Ln a 
L t a  
.e 
Ma 
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Definition 
Nose deflection angle divided by free play deflection limit 
Modal coefficient of nth mode 
Ln a (Xn - ~ 0 )  
L n  a (xn  - ~ 0 )  * 
Lna x n  (Xn -xO) 
Vehicle transverse moment of inertia 
Moment of inertia of portion of vehicle forward of xo , taken about x = x 0  
Io + m o  xo (Eo -0) 
Nose joint spring constant 
Total lift per unit rigid angle of attack 
Nose l i f t  per unit angle of attack 
Tail lift per unit angle of attack 
Running airload 
Pitching moment per unit rigid angle of attack 
Unit -
-- 
ft (n = 0) 
lb-ft 
lb-ft2 
lb-ft2 
slug- f t  
slug-ft2 
lb- ft/rad 
lb 
lb 
lb 
lb/ft 
lb-ft 
0 
r S  y mbol 
% 
m 
m0 
Qn 
r 
T 
t 
V 
X 
xO 
xn 
X t  
XO 
- 
z 
a 
6 
R 
w 
Vehicle total mass 
Mass forward of x = x0 
Generalized force for the nth mode 
Definition Unit 
mo (Go - xo) 
Kinetic energy 
Time 
Flight velocity 
Coordinate along body centerline, zero at c.g., positive forward 
x at nose joint 
x at nose center of pressure 
x at tail center of pressure 
x at c.g. of mass forward of x o  
Lateral displacement 
Angle of attack 
Joint free play rotation 
Complex frequency 
Natural bending frequency 
lb-ft 
slug 
slug 
lb (n=O) 
lb-ft (n = 1) 
lb-ft2 (n=2) 
-- 
slug-ft '/sec2 
sec 
ft/sec 
f t  
f t  
ft 
f t  
f t  
f t  
rad 
rad 
rad/sec 
rad/sec o r  
CPS 
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Appendix C 
Def in i t ion  of  Terms 
These definitions a r e  included, since explicit word definitions have not previously been estab- 
lished by the technical community for Aerobee rocket applications. 
Yuu) (Pitch)-Roll Resonance 
The time at which the rocket's aerodynamic natural pitching frequency and roll frequency a r e  
equal. 
YULV (Pitch)-Roll Coupling 
The establishment of a dynamic interaction between the roll and yaw (pitch) frequencies of the 
rocket which occurs immediately after yaw (pitch)-roll resonance. Yaw (pitch)- roll coupling does 
not produce catastrophic rocket motion. 
Yaw (Pi LCh) - Ro 11 LO ck- IIZ 
A result of the yaw (pitch)-roll coupling phenomenon which exists when the rocket is coupled 
for an extended period of time and is accompanied by larger  quasi-precessional rocket yawing 
(pitching) motion. 
Catastrophic Yaw (Pitch) 
A condition producing catastrophic (excessively large) quasi-precessional rocket motion which 
is always preceded by yaw (pitch)-roll lock-in. 
Bimodal Cozipling 
A dynamic interaction between the aerodynamic natural pitching frequency and one of the 
"complex" structural frequencies of the rocket. 
Bimodal Instability 
The result of the bimodal coupling which produces a n  increasing quasi-precessional rocket 
motion, detrimental to rocket performance, and is a mechanism for producing yaw (pitch)-roll 
coupling, yaw (pitch)- roll lock-in, and potentially catastrophic yaw (pitch). 
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